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In this note, we provide (i) the derivation of the cursed equilibrium and analogy-based
expectation equilibrium (which are the same under our specification) and (ii) the derivation
of L1′s bids with a discrete bid space (which is analogous to ILN’s Proposition 3).
A Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and
Cursed Equilibrium
The set of signals is X = {0, 1, . . . , 10}. Let ωx1,x2 correspond to the state where player i’s
signal is xi (i = 1, 2). There are 121 (= 11×11) possible states, ωx1,x2 ∈ Ω. The item’s value
at ωx1,x2 is max{x1, x2}. Each state is equally possible. We have
P1 = {{ωx1,0, ωx1,1, ωx1,2, ωx1,3, ωx1,4, ωx1,5, ωx1,6, ωx1,7, ωx1,8, ωx1,9, ωx1,10}x1∈X}
P2 = {{ω0,x2 , ω1,x2 , ω2,x2 , ω3,x2 , ω4,x2 , ω5,x2 , ω6,x2 , ω7,x2 , ω8,x2 , ω9,x2 , ω10,x2}x2∈X}.
where Pi is the partition of the states from player i’s point of view.
Let Ai be the analogy partitions of the states from player i’s point of view (i = 1, 2).
For the analogy based expectation equilibrium, we assume that Ai = Pi for i = 1, 2, i.e., the
private information analogy partition (Jehiel and Koessler (2008, p. 538)). This is visualized
in Figure 1. As Jehiel and Koessler (2008, p.539) and Eyster and Rabin (2005, p.1634) note,
this specification coincides with the fully cursed equilibrium (i.e., χ = 1, in Eyster and
Rabin (2005) χ-cursed equilibrium). Thus, the analogy-based expectation equilibrium that
we construct is also a fully cursed equilibrium.
Note that E[Xmax | 10] = 10. For xi ∈ X\{10}, the expected value of the item is
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Figure 1: Partitions of States
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xi 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
E[Xmax | xi] 5 5611 5811 6111 6511 7011 7611 8311 9111 10011 10
bl(xi) 5 5.09 5.27 5.54 5.90 6.36 6.90 7.54 8.27 9.09 10
bh(xi) 5 5.10 5.28 5.55 5.91 6.37 6.91 7.55 8.28 9.10 10
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Table 1: xi, E[X
max | xi] and Equilibrium Strategy
b 5 5.09 5.10 5.27 5.28 5.54 5.55 5.90 5.91 6.36
ρ¯(b) 1
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b 6.37 6.90 6.91 7.54 7.55 8.27 8.28 9.09 9.10 10
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Table 2: Strategy of player j perceived by player i
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Table 1 shows the value of E[Xmax | xi] for each xi ∈ X.
Suppose that player i with xi chooses b
l(xi) =
b100E[Xmax|xi]c
100
with probability ρ(xi) ∈ (0, 1)
and bh(xi) =
d100E[Xmax|xi]e
100
with 1− ρ(xi) where
ρ(xi) =
bh(xi)− E[Xmax | xi]
bh(xi)− bl(xi) ∈ (0, 1)
for each xi ∈ X.1 Table 1 shows their values for each xi ∈ X. It is important to note that for
each xi, (i) b
l(xi) < E[X
max | xi] < bh(xi) and (ii) ρ(xi)bl(xi) + (1− ρ(xi))bh(xi) = E[Xmax |
xi]. Let
Bp =
{
b ∈ B | there exists xi such that b = bl(xi) or b = bh(xi)
}
.
Given the strategy specified above, Table 2 shows the strategy for player j perceived by player
i, ρ¯. Note that ρ¯ is independent of the state.
Given ρ¯, the expected payoff for player i with xi from bi ∈ B is computed as follows: If
1That is, we choose two numbers in B closest to E[Xmax | xi].
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player i chooses bi ∈ B\Bp,(
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Note (i) that bi = 5 is a best response for xi = 0, (ii) bi = 10 is a best response for xi = 10, and
(iii) that every bi < b
l(xi) and bi > b
h(xi) cannot be a best response for each xi ∈ X\{0, 10},
meaning that the only remaining bids are {bl(xi), bh(xi)} for each xi ∈ X\{0, 10}.2 Given
xi ∈ {0, 10}, the expected payoff from bi = bl(xi) is
∑
b<bl(xi),b∈Bp
ρ¯(b) {E[Xmax | xi]− b}+ ρ¯(bl(xi))
{
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while the expected payoff from bi = b
h(xi) is
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E[Xmax | xi]− [ρ(xi)bl(xi) + (1− ρ(xi))bh(xi)]
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= 0
where the last equality comes from the fact that ρ(xi)b
l(xi)+(1−ρ(xi))bh(xi) = E[Xmax | xi]
for each xi ∈ X. This shows that both bl(xi) and bh(xi) are best responses for each xi ∈
X\{0, 10}. The strategy specified above hence constitutes an analogy-based expectation
2More generally, any bi < 5.09 is a best response for xi = 0 and any bi > 9.10 is a best response for
xi = 10.
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equilibrium with private information analogy partition, and hence is also a fully cursed
equilibrium.
B ILN’s Proposition 3 with a Discrete Bid Space
We derive random L1’s best-responses for BL/SBF under the assumption that random L0
randomizes uniformly over B0 = {0, 0.01, . . . , 9.99, 10} ⊂ B. Given signal xi ∈ X, the
following expression is the expected payoff for player i by bidding bi ∈ B. Note that we use
“cents” instead of “dollars”.
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.
Given that bi ∈ B0 and the expression above is quadratic, the expected payoff is max-
imized at either E[Xmax | xi] − 0.01 or E[Xmax | xi] + 0.01 (in dollars). We numerically
computed the values of the expected payoff at these points, and selected the bid with the
highest expected payoff as the best-response.
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